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Abstract
We examine how asymmetric information and competition in the credit market
aﬀect voluntary information sharing between lenders. We study an experimental
credit market in which information sharing can help lenders to distinguish good bor-
rowers from bad ones, because borrowers may exogenously switch locations. Lenders
are, however, engaged in spatial competition, and thus may lose market power by
sharing information with competitors. Our results suggest that asymmetric infor-
mation in the credit market increases the frequency of information sharing between
lenders signiﬁcantly. Competition between lenders reduces information sharing, but
the impact of competition seems to be only of second order importance.
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The systematic use of credit reports in assessing loan applications is one of the most
remarkable developments in retail banking. Today, loan approvals no longer take days or
weeks, but are made in minutes, thanks to information derived from credit reports. Over
the past 30 years, the number of reports issued by credit bureaus in the United States has
increased ten-fold, so that nowadays over 3 million credit reports are issued on a daily
basis (Hunt, 2005). Beyond the United States, the credit reporting industry has also seen
substantial developments. Examining data for 129 countries, Djankov et al. (2007) show
that the number of countries with a public credit registry increased from 21% in 1978
to 53% in 2003, while the number of countries with at least one private credit bureau
increased from 16% to 41% over the same period.
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the emergence of information sharing
through private credit bureaus. Private credit bureaus rely on voluntary information
exchange between lenders, which typically involves a trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, lenders
beneﬁt from information sharing, as it helps them to select good from bad loan applicants
(Pagano and Jappelli, 1993). Moreover, information sharing can overcome moral hazard
on the part of borrowers, motivating them to exert greater eﬀort in projects (Vercammen,
1995; Padilla and Pagano, 2000, and repay loans (Klein, 1992). On the other hand,
sharing information may expose lenders to increased competition because they release
private information about their existing clients. Banks may therefore be wary of sharing
information in competitive credit markets, and may be particularly reluctant to share
information with close competitors (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993).1
Can competition in the banking sector hinder the emergence of information sharing in
markets where adverse selection would make it valuable from a social point of view? This is
an empirical question, and the answer depends on the relative impact of adverse selection
and lender competition on information sharing behavior. So far, there is little evidence
on these two forces that drive voluntary information sharing. Historical records show that
credit reporting in the United States did initially emerge among non-competing lenders
(Olegario, 2003). Anecdotal evidence from Russia also demonstrates the reluctance of
banks to participate in the same credit bureau as their rivals. After the introduction of
a law in 2005 forcing all lenders to join at least one bureau, many lenders set up their
own credit bureaus, in order to avoid sharing information with competitors.2 In contrast
to this, it is striking that many bureaus collect and distribute information speciﬁcally
for the consumer credit market, which is arguably one of the most competitive retail
1In a recent paper, Bouckaert and Degryse (2006) show that the incentives to unilaterally disclose
information on default behavior also depend on lenders’ inherent market power.
2See http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/0/0.html?id issue=11383470.
1segments (Hunt, 2005; San Jos´ e Riestra, 2002). It appears therefore that, at least in
consumer credit, the beneﬁts of sharing information may outweigh the costs of increased
competition. So far, however, there is no systematic analysis of the driving forces behind
information sharing to support this conjecture.
We examine - in a laboratory credit market - how adverse selection and lender competi-
tion aﬀect voluntary information sharing between lenders. We implement an experimental
credit market which is characterized by adverse selection: Lenders know that there are
good and bad borrowers, but they can only identify the type of borrowers in their “home
market”. Borrowers may switch their location, in which case lenders can only identify the
type of entrants to their market if they share information with lenders who are situated
in other markets. The higher the probability that borrowers switch location, the more
severe the problem of adverse selection, and the stronger the incentives to share infor-
mation. Our credit market is also characterized by lender competition, which reduces
information sharing incentives. We implement a simple form of spatial competition: Each
lender has one direct competitor and two lenders with whom he does not compete at all.
In such a situation, lenders beneﬁt from sharing information with non-competitors, but
lose market power if they share information with direct competitors. The advantage of
our experimental approach is that we can exogenously vary both the degree of adverse
selection, i.e. borrower mobility, as well as the intensity of competition between lenders.
By comparing the outcome across treatments we can therefore identify how exogenous
changes in information conditions and lender competition aﬀect the emergence of infor-
mation sharing. Our experimental approach also allows us to compare the relative impact
of adverse selection and lender competition on information sharing behavior.
Our experimental results conﬁrm the hypothesis that adverse selection and lender
competition both systematically aﬀect voluntary information sharing. In treatments with
high borrower mobility, information sharing between our experimental lenders is more
frequent than in (otherwise identical) treatments with low borrower mobility. Similarly,
treatments with strong competition between lenders display lower levels of information
sharing than (otherwise identical) treatments with weak lender competition. Our results,
however, also suggest that the impact of adverse selection on information sharing is much
stronger than that of lender competition. An increase in the level of borrower mobility
raises the level of information sharing substantially. In contrast, increasing the level of
lender competition leads only to a small reduction in information sharing. Our ﬁnding,
that adverse selection has a stronger impact on information sharing than lender compe-
tition, is particulary important for the outcome of markets where both are high, such as
in the consumer credit market. In our experiment we ﬁnd that when potential adverse
selection is strong, information sharing between lenders is very frequent even if lenders
2are engaged in intense competition.
Our ﬁndings contribute to the growing empirical literature on the role of information
sharing in ﬁnancial market development. Several recent studies have demonstrated that
information sharing is beneﬁcial to credit market performance. Credit scoring models
based on credit bureau data suggests that the use of credit reports allows lenders to more
accurately predict loan defaults (Kallberg and Udell, 2003; Barron and Staten, 2003;
Luoto et al., 2007; Powell et al., 2004). Moreover, recent experimental results indicate
that information sharing disciplines borrowers to repay loans (Brown and Zehnder, forth-
coming). Cross-country evidence, meanwhile, supports the conjecture that information
sharing improves credit availability. Aggregate credit market volume is higher in coun-
tries where information sharing is more developed (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Djankov
et al., 2007). Moreover, analyses of ﬁrm-level data (Galindo and Miller, 2001; Love and
Mylenko, 2003; Brown et al., 2007) show that access to bank credit is easier in countries
where credit bureaus or registries exist. While existing evidence conﬁrms that informa-
tion sharing between lenders is beneﬁcial for credit market performance, there is little
evidence examining the circumstances in which credit bureaus emerge. Pagano and Jap-
pelli (1993) show that consumer credit reporting in OECD countries is positively related
to household mobility, and thus to potential adverse selection for banks. However, there
is, to our knowledge, no systematic evidence on how credit market competition interacts
with adverse selection in determining voluntary information sharing. Our experimental
results provide a ﬁrst attempt at closing this gap.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Part 2 presents our experimental design
and part 3 our predictions. Part 4 presents our results, and part 5 concludes.
2 Experimental design
We examine the voluntary exchange of information between lenders in a competitive credit
market characterized by asymmetric information. Similar to Pagano and Jappelli (1993),
lenders only know the type of borrowers in their home market. As there is a positive prob-
ability that borrowers switch locations, lenders may want to exchange information about
borrowers. However, as lenders compete for borrowers, information sharing constitutes a
trade-oﬀ: Should lenders join the bureau in order to gain information on borrowers which
may move to their market, or should they stay out of the bureau in order to hide good
borrowers in their home market from competitors.
32.1 Credit market
Our credit market is divided into two regions, A and B, and in each region there are
two sectors. Sectors S1a n dS2 are in region A, sectors S3a n dS4a r ei nr e g i o nB .
In each sector there is one lender (L1i nS1, L2i nS2, L3i nS3, L4i nS4), and four
entrepreneurs (E1-E4i nS1, E5-E8i nS2, E9-E12 in S3a n dE13-E16 in S4). Each
entrepreneur requires a loan of I = 100 points in order to realize a project. In each region
there is one good entrepreneur who yields a return of Yg = 300 points from his project
and three bad entrepreneurs who yield an income of Yb = 0 from their project. Figure 1








S2 S1 Region A





Figure 1: Structure of the credit market
The participants in our experiment all take the role of lenders. Entrepreneurs are
simulated. The strategic interaction between our experimental lenders takes place in six
phases:
In phase 1, each lender gets to know the type of all four entrepreneurs in his home
sector. Which entrepreneur is good in each sector is randomly determined at the beginning
of each period. Lenders do not get any information about the entrepreneurs’ types in the
other three sectors of the credit market.
In phase 2, each lender decides whether to join the credit bureau or not. The two
lenders who are in the same region decide sequentially. In each period the “ﬁrst-mover” for
each region is randomly determined. Before deciding whether to join the credit bureau, the
“second-mover” in each region is informed about the decision of the ﬁrst-mover. Neither
the ﬁrst-, nor the second-mover in one region are informed about the decisions of lenders
in the other region until after they have made their own decisions. Membership of the
credit bureau bears no cost, and information sharing is reciprocal: All members of the
4credit bureau get to know the type of all entrepreneurs from the home sector of all other
bureau members. Non-members receive no information on entrepreneurs outside of their
home sector. In return, bureau members do not receive information on an entrepreneur
if the lender from his home sector does not join the bureau.3
In phase 3, entrepreneurs switch sectors with a probability α. If entrepreneurs switch
their sector, they do so in groups, and switch to the other region. All entrepreneurs from
sector S1 move to sector S3 (and vice versa), while all entrepreneurs from sector S2m o v e
to sector S4 (and vice versa). The fact that entrepreneurs switch in groups guarantees
that, if they switch, there remain one good entrepreneur and three bad ones in each sector.
The fact that entrepreneurs always switch regions simpliﬁes the strategic interaction, as
lenders know that if switching occurs they can no longer access any borrower they already
have information on. Whether entrepreneurs switch or not is determined by the physical
roll of a dice.
In phase 4, lenders simultaneously make credit oﬀers. Before doing so, each lender
is informed about which other lenders have joined the credit bureau, and whether the
entrepreneurs have switched locations. Each lender can make credit oﬀers to entrepreneurs
who at this point in time are situated in the same region. Lenders L1a n dL2 can oﬀer
credit to any entrepreneur situated in region A. Lenders L3a n dL4 can oﬀer credit to any
entrepreneur situated in region B. The size of a credit is ﬁxed at I = 100 points. When
making a credit oﬀer, the lender must specify his requested repayment ˜ R ∈ [100,300].
In order to make a credit oﬀer to a particular entrepreneur, a lender must select the ID
number of the entrepreneur. Each lender is endowed with funds of 200 points in each
period, and can therefore make at most two credit oﬀers. As there are two lenders and
only two good borrowers per region our design implies competition between lenders for the
good entrepreneurs in a region. Intra-regional competition in our experiment is however
incomplete. A credit oﬀer to the entrepreneur situated in the home sector of the lender
bears no transaction costs c = 0. In contrast, a credit oﬀer to an entrepreneur in the
other sector of the region involves positive transaction costs of c = T. Overall our design
3For the sake of simplicity we ﬁx, by design, the type of potential information sharing which can
take place: Lenders can exchange information about the types of borrowers in their home market, and
they can do so only on a reciprocal basis. We measure the extent of voluntary information sharing
by studying the frequency with which lenders use this available information sharing mechanism. In
reality, the extent of information sharing depends not only on how many banks share information, but
also on what type of information they exchange. Some credit registries and credit bureaus only enable
the exchange of information on loan defaults (“negative information”), while others also facilitate the
exchange of information on open credit lines, successful loan repayments and borrower characteristics
(“positive information”). Obviously, it would be interesting to study not only how many lenders share
information voluntarily, but also what type of information they would choose to share. In our experimental
credit market, the only information worth exchanging relates to borrower types, as borrowers cannot
default, and they cannot maintain multiple bank relationships.
5implements a simple form of spatial competition: Each lender has one direct competitor
with whom he competes in an incomplete manner, and two lenders with whom he does
not compete at all.
In phase 5, each entrepreneur can accept one of the credit oﬀers made to him. En-
trepreneurs in our experiment are programmed to accept the credit oﬀer with the lowest
requested repayment. If an entrepreneur receives two credit oﬀers with equal repayment
requests he chooses that of the lender from the sector he is situated in. This is com-
mon knowledge among lenders. The lenders’ repayment requests are enforceable, but we
assume that there is limited liability of entrepreneurs. Thus, good entrepreneurs make
actual loan repayments of R = ˜ R, while bad entrepreneur make repayments of 0.
In phase 6, the lenders get to know the credit market outcome and their payoﬀs.
Lenders also ﬁnd out the type of each entrepreneur in their region and are informed
about all credit oﬀers made by themselves and the other lender in their region. Lenders
also get to know which of their credit oﬀers were accepted and their resulting payoﬀ. It






200, if no credit oﬀer is accepted
100 + R1 − c1, if one credit oﬀer is accepted
R1 − c1 + R2 − c2, if two credit oﬀers is accepted
Each session of our experiment involves 12 participants and lasts 20 periods. As all
participants are assigned the role of lenders, there are three identical credit markets in
each period with four lenders each. Each period involves a restart of the experiment:
Lenders are randomly reassigned to one of the three credit markets, and the location of
the good entrepreneur in each sector of each credit market is randomly determined.
2.2 Treatments and procedures
We implement four treatments of our experiment. Treatments diﬀer only in the probability
of entrepreneurs switching α and the transaction costs of intra-regional lending T.I no r d e r
to study the impact of borrower mobility and lender competition on information sharing
we vary both factors independently. We implement treatments in which borrower mobility
is high (α = .75) and treatments in which borrower mobility is low (α = .25). For both
levels of borrower mobility we implement one treatment in which lending competition
is high, because transactions costs of intra-regional lending are low (T = 60), and one
treatment in which lender competition is low because transaction costs are high (T = 160).
Table 1 summarizes our experiment design.
In total we conducted 20 experimental sessions, ﬁve for each of our four treatments.
All experimental subjects were volunteers and each participant could only participate in
6one session (i.e., each subject experienced only one of the treatments). All sessions were
conducted in June 2006 and participants were students at the University of Zurich or
the ETH Zurich. The computerized experiment was programmed and conducted with
the z-Tree experimental software (Fischbacher, 2007). A session lasted approximately
ninety minutes. Subjects received a show-up fee of CHF 10 (CHF1.3 ≈ 1.00 USD in June
2006)and CHF1 additional franc for every 150 points earned during the experiment. On
average subjects earned CHF 55.
Table 1: Experimental Treatments
Intra-regional transaction costs
(T =1 6 0 ) ( T = 60)
Mobility
LowMobility- LowMobility-
(α = .25) LowCompetition HighCompetition
HighMobility- HighMobility-
(α = .75) LowCompetition HighCompetition
To make sure that all participants fully understand the decision process and the pay-
ment structure of the game, each subject had to read a detailed set of instructions before
a session was started. After reading the instructions, participants had to pass a test with
control questions. No session started before all subjects had correctly answered all control
questions. An English version of our instructions is provided in Appendix B.4
3 Predictions
We derive our predictions by backward induction, assuming that all lenders are risk-
neutral. We ﬁrst examine lenders’ credit decisions, depending on the information condi-
tions in the market. We then examine the decision of lenders to join the credit bureau.
We describe the full set of pure strategy equilibria for our experiment, depending on the
mobility of entrepreneurs α and the degree of intra-regional competition determined by
T. This allows us to make precise predictions for each of our four treatments.
4The original German instructions, as well as the z-Tree codes are available upon request from the
authors.
73.1 Credit
No lender will make a credit oﬀer to an entrepreneur he knows is “bad”, as he would incur
a certain loss of I = 100 if the entrepreneur is situated in his own sector, and a loss of
100 + T if the entrepreneur is in the other sector of the region. Furthermore, no lender
will lend to an entrepreneur of an unknown type. The expected proﬁt from lending to an
unidentiﬁed entrepreneur in the same sector is πL
i = .25 · Yg − I = −25. The expected
proﬁt from lending to an unidentiﬁed entrepreneur in the other sector of the lender’s
region is consequently also negative πL
i = −25−T. Therefore, from now on we only need
to consider oﬀers to entrepreneurs that are known to be good. If a lender knows that he
is the only lender in his region who knows that a particular entrepreneur i is good, he
will demand the maximum repayment ˜ Ri = Yg = 300. He does this because he knows
that the entrepreneur will receive no credit oﬀer from his competitor. In this case, the
lender’s proﬁt from the contract with entrepreneur i is either πL
i = Yg − I = 200, if the
entrepreneur is in the lender’s home sector, or πL
i = 200 − T if the entrepreneur is in the
other sector of the region. If, however, both lenders in a region know that entrepreneur
i is good, price competition implies that each lender will make an oﬀer with a requested
repayment ˜ Ri = I +T = 100+T, which is the lowest proﬁtable oﬀer the “outside” lender
can make. As, by assumption, entrepreneurs always accept the oﬀer of the home lender
in the event of identical repayment requests, the lender situated in the same sector as
entrepreneur i will conclude a contract with him and makes a proﬁt of πL
i = T.
3.2 Information sharing
In our experiment, decisions to join the credit bureau are made sequentially within regions
and simultaneously across regions. Lemma 1 characterizes the best-response behavior of
the second-mover lender in each region, given the decision of his competitor and the
(unknown) behavior of the two non-competing lenders from the other region.
Lemma 1. (second-mover behavior) i) If the ﬁrst-mover lender in a region does not
join the credit bureau, the second-mover lender is strictly better oﬀ by joining, if at least
one non-competing lender also joins. If no other lender joins, then the second-mover
lender is indiﬀerent between joining and not. ii) If the ﬁrst-mover lender in a region
does join the credit bureau, then the second-mover lender is better oﬀ by joining only if
(Yg − I)(1 − α) ≤ (1 − α + γα)T, where γ ∈{ 0;.5;1} is the share of non-competing
lenders from the other region that join.
Proof. see Appendix A.1.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is straightforward: i) If a lender’s direct competitor is
8not a bureau member, information sharing can only be beneﬁcial. If entrepreneurs switch
regions, then being the only bureau member clearly is an advantage if at least one of
the lenders in the other region has also joined the bureau. In this case, the lender has
exclusive information in its region and can extract monopoly proﬁts from all identiﬁed
good entrepreneurs. If the entrepreneurs remain in their initial sectors, nothing is lost
from joining, as the competitor in the other sector of the region has not joined and will
not receive any information. If no other lender joins the credit bureau, a lender can
neither beneﬁt nor lose from joining the bureau. ii) If a lender’s direct competitor joins,
information sharing has beneﬁcial and adverse eﬀects. Whether the net eﬀect of joining is
positive or negative depends on three factors: The mobility of borrowers (α), the market
power of lenders in their home market (T) and the number of lenders from the other
region who join the credit bureau. The net eﬀect of information sharing is more likely to
be positive if entrepreneurs switch their location very often, if lenders have strong market
power and if the non-competing lenders of the other region join the credit bureau.
Having characterized the best response behavior of the second-mover in each region,
we can now characterize proﬁt-maximizing behavior of the ﬁrst-mover:
Lemma 2. (ﬁrst-mover behavior) i) The ﬁrst-mover lender in a region is strictly better
oﬀ by joining the credit bureau if at least one non-competing lender also joins. ii) If no
non-competing lender joins, the ﬁrst-mover lender is indiﬀerent between joining and not.
Proof. If the ﬁrst-mover does join the credit bureau he knows that the second-mover will
also join if (Yg − I)(1 − α) ≤ (1 − α + γα)T,w h e r eγ ∈{ 0;.5;1} is the share of non-
competing lenders that join. Given that under these conditions the second-mover ﬁnds it
proﬁtable to join and payoﬀs of lenders are symmetric, the ﬁrst-mover must also be better
oﬀ by joining the bureau. If (Yg − I)(1 − α) > (1 − α + γα)T, the second-mover would
not join after the ﬁrst-mover joins and the ﬁrst-mover is at least better oﬀ by joining the
credit bureau than by not doing so. He is strictly better oﬀ if at least one non-competing
lender joins γ ∈{ 0.5;1} (see proof of Lemma 1).
Lemma 1 and 2 allow us to characterize the full set of Nash equilibria for our ex-
periment, depending on the “mobility” of entrepreneurs α and intra-regional transaction
costs T. For all combinations of parameters there exists an equilibrium in which no lender
joins the credit bureau. If no other lender joins the credit bureau it is a (weakly) best
response for the remaining lender not to join as well. However, the no sharing equilibrium
is not trembling-hand perfect in the sense of Selten (1975).5 We therefore neglect these
equilibria in the rest of the paper.
5Intuitively, the problem can be understood as follows: In the no sharing equilibrium all played
strategies are only weakly best responses, i.e., if no other lender joins, lenders are indiﬀerent between
joining and not joining. Thus, if we assume that the lenders through a “slip of the hand” or tremble,
9Proposition 1 summarizes the conditions under which full sharing of information (both
the ﬁrst-mover and second-mover lender per region join the credit bureau) can be sus-
tained. The proposition shows that full information sharing can be sustained if borrowers
are suﬃciently mobile (high α) and/or the competition from other lenders is suﬃciently
weak (high transaction costs T).
Proposition 1. There exists a Nash equilibrium in which all lenders join the credit bureau
with certainty if and only if (Yg − I)(1 − α) ≤ T.
Proof. If both lenders in region B join the credit bureau we have γ =1 . Now consider
the best response of the second-mover lender in region A if the ﬁrst-mover has joined the
credit bureau. From Lemma 1 we know that with γ = 1 the best-response for the lender
is to join if (Yg − I)(1 − α) ≤ T. Furthermore, from Lemma 2 we know that if both
non-competing lenders join the credit bureau, the ﬁrst-mover lender is strictly better oﬀ
by joining as well.
Proposition 2 summarizes the conditions under which partial sharing of information
can be sustained in equilibrium; i.e. only the ﬁrst-mover lender per region joins the credit
bureau. The proposition shows that when the market power of lenders in their home
sector is weak and/or when borrowers are rather immobile, equilibria exist in which no
lender shares information with direct competitors.
Proposition 2. There exists a Nash equilibrium in which only the ﬁrst-mover lender per
region joins the credit bureau if and only if (Yg − I)(1− α) > (1 − 1
2α)T.
Proof. Suppose that one non-competing lender joins the credit bureau so that γ = 1
2.
Now consider the best response of the second-mover lender if the ﬁrst-mover has joined
the credit bureau. From Lemma 1 it is clear that with γ = 1
2 the best-response for the
lender is not to join if (Yg − I)(1− α) > (1 − 1
2α)T. From Lemma 2 we further know
that if one non-competing lender joins the credit bureau, the ﬁrst-mover lender is strictly
better oﬀ by joining as well.
Proposition 1 replicates the main ﬁndings of Pagano and Jappelli (1993): the level
of information sharing is positively related to the “mobility” of borrowers and negatively
related to competition in the credit market. In contrast to their analysis, however, spatial
competition between lenders in our experiment yields two additional interesting predic-
tions:6
may choose unintended strategies with a negligible but positive probability, then not joining is strictly
dominated by joining. In diﬀerent words, if there is only the slightest probability that one of the lenders
in the other region may join, no sharing is no longer an equilibrium.
6Pagano and Jappelli (1993) do assume in their model that some lenders are more distant than others,
but do not analyze the consequences of this assumption for information sharing equilibria.
101. When market conditions cannot sustain information sharing between all lenders,
there exist partial sharing equilibria in which lenders exchange information only
with non-competitors (see Proposition 2).
2. Even when full information sharing can be sustained, partial information sharing
may arise due to a “coordination failure” among non-competing lenders. Comparing
Propositions 1 and 2 we see that there exists a range of parameters (G − I)(1−α) <
T<(G − I)(1−α) 2
2−α for which both full-sharing and partial-sharing of information
among lenders is feasible.7
The intuition for the ﬁrst result comes from the fact that in our type of spatial com-
petition it does not hurt to share information with non-competitors. As soon as at least
one lender in the other region joins there is a strict incentive for at least one lender in a
region to join as well, i.e., there must always be an equilibrium in which at least two non-
competing lenders join the credit bureau.8 The intuition for the second result comes from
the fact that under spatial competition the value of joining the credit bureau depends on
how many non-competitors join. Under some parameter constellations it may be the case
that the second-mover lender in region A will join only if both non-competing lenders
from region B join, but not if only one of them is a member of the credit bureau. There
thus exists the potential for “coordination failure” among non-competing lenders, leading
to multiple equilibria for a considerable range of parameter constellations. Note that this
second result relies not only on spatial competition, but also on our assumption that the
decisions to join the credit bureau are simultaneous across regions. If the decisions of
lenders to join the credit bureau are made fully sequentially, the potential for “coordi-
nation failure” between non-competing lenders does not arise. However, fully sequential
joining decisions imply that all lenders can perfectly observe the behavior of all other
potential members of the credit bureau. It is rather unlikely that this will be the case in
7For the same range of parameters there also exists one mixed-strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium
the ﬁrst-movers in both regions join the bureau, while the second-movers both join with a positive
probability.
8An alternative type of spatial competition would be to assume symmetric, imperfect competition
with costs of c = T for all cross-sectoral transactions. In this case, we would yield for each parameter
constellation either a unique full-sharing or a no-sharing equilibrium.To see this, suppose that it is the
best response for lender j to join the credit bureau if one other lender i also joins. In this case, it
must be proﬁt-maximizing for both other lenders in the credit market to join the bureau as the beneﬁts
of joining increase with the number of other participants, while the costs do not. Thus if all lenders
compete with each other (imperfectly at transaction costs T), there exits for each parameter constellation
either a unique full-sharing or a no-sharing equilibrium. Despite the improvements in communication
technology we believe, however, that the assumption of “diﬀerentiated” competition among lenders is
more realistic than to assume that all lenders compete with each other at the same intensity. Degryse
and Ongena (2005), for example, showed recently that distance between ﬁrms, lenders, and competitor
lenders strongly inﬂuence loan terms in Belgium.
11reality. Another interpretation of fully sequential moves is that a third party can credibly
announce that he will approach all potential members sequentially, and that they will be
fully bound by their promises to exchange information. In practice, private entrepreneurs
do perform this task, and are instrumental in establishing reciprocal credit bureaus (for
example Experian or CRIF in Eastern Europe). However, it is highly unlikely that all
lenders believe that all other lenders will be approached and will bide by their promises
to join.9
3.3 Predictions by treatment
Applying Proposition 1 we see that a full-sharing equilibrium, in which both lenders
in each region join the credit bureau, is feasible in three of our four treatments. The
condition (Yg − I)(1 − α) ≤ T is fulﬁlled in the “LowMobility-LowCompetition” treat-
ment (α = .25; T = 160), in the “HighMobility-HighCompetition” treatment (α = .75;
T = 60), and in the “HighMobility-LowCompetition” treatment (α = .75; T =1 6 0 ) .
Full-sharing is, however, not feasible in our “LowMobility-HighCompetition” treatment
(α = .25; T = 60). By applying Proposition 2 we further see that a partial-
sharing equilibrium, i.e., only 1 lender per region joins the credit bureau, is feasi-
ble in three of our four treatments. The condition (Yg − I)(1 − α) ≥ (1 − 1
2α)T is
fulﬁlled in the “LowMobility-LowCompetition”, “HighMobility-HighCompetition”, and
“LowMobility-HighCompetition” treatments. Partial-sharing is, however, not feasible in
our “HighMobility-LowCompetition” treatment.
Figure 2 displays the predictions for our experiment and illustrates the rationale be-
hind our choice of treatments. We implement two benchmark treatments in which only one
equilibrium type is feasible. In the “HighMobility-LowCompetition” treatment, lenders
have little to lose and lots to gain from sharing information, and we therefore expect
full information sharing (2 lenders per region). The opposite case is the “LowMobility-
HighCompetition” treatment, where lenders have lots to lose and little to gain from
sharing information. Here we expect that lenders will never share information with
their competitors, so that only partial information sharing takes place (1 lender per re-
gion). Comparing the outcome of the “HighMobility-LowCompetition” to that of the
“LowMobility-HighCompetition” treatment we should therefore ﬁnd a substantial joint
9Note that our predictions are not aﬀected if we assume that lenders make completely simultaneous
decisions, i.e., joining decision are not only made simultaneously across regions but also within regions.
The only diﬀerence is the following: With completely simultaneous decisions with respect to information
s h a r i n gi ti sn o td e t e r m i n e dw h i c ho ft h et w ol e n d e r si nar e g i o nj o i n st h ec r e d i tb u r e a ui nap a r t i a l
sharing equilibrium. If the decision to join is taken sequentially within each region, then the ﬁrst-mover
will join the credit bureau and the second-mover will not, i.e., simultaneous decisions within regions
create a coordination problem for the lenders in a region, but do not aﬀect individual incentives to join
the credit bureau.













Figure 2: Market Equilibria
In the “HighMobility-HighCompetition” both full information sharing and partial
sharing are feasible. The actual outcome of this treatment thus allows us to examine
whether information sharing emerges when strong adverse selection makes it valuable,
but strong lender competition reduces banks incentives to exchange information. By
comparing the actual outcome of this treatment to our benchmark treatments we can
establish and compare the individual impact of borrower mobility and lender competition
on information sharing. Comparing the outcome of the “HighMobility-HighCompetition”
treatment to that of the “HighMobility-LowCompetition” treatment will show us the in-
dividual impact of lender competition on information sharing. The comparison of the
“HighMobility-HighCompetition” and “LowMobility-HighCompetition” treatments will
show us the individual impact of borrower mobility on information sharing.
In the “LowMobility-LowCompetition” full information sharing and partial sharing
are also feasible. The actual outcome of this treatment also allows us to establish and
compare the individual impact of borrower mobility and lender competition on informa-
tion sharing. Comparing the outcome of the “LowMobility-LowCompetition” treatment
to that of the “LowMobility-HighCompetition” treatment gives us further evidence on the
individual impact of lender competition on information sharing. The comparison of the
“LowMobility-LowCompetition” and “HighMobility-LowCompetition” treatments yields
additional evidence on the individual impact of borrower mobility on information sharing.
Our predictions are derived under the assumption of risk neutrality of lenders. In
13Appendix A.2 we investigate how risk aversion aﬀects the feasibility of partial and full
information sharing in our experiment. We show there that the presence of risk averse
lenders enlarges (reduces) the set of parameter constellations for which full (partial) in-
formation sharing is feasible. This is intuitive, as full information sharing means that all
lenders realize a safe payoﬀ, while partial information sharing implies that lenders earn
risky payoﬀs. However, it is rather unlikely that our participants are risk-averse enough to
alter the equilibrium predictions for our four treatments. The treatment that is most likely
to be aﬀected is the “HighMobility-HighCompetition” treatment. If lenders are strongly
risk-averse, partial sharing is no longer an equilibrium in this treatment. However, the
degree of risk-aversion needed for this to be the case is implausibly high (see Observation
A2 in Appendix A.2 for details). For example, a participant with such preferences would
rather take a ﬁxed payment of 108 points (CHF 0.72) instead of lottery where he would
get 300 points (CHF 2.00) with probability 0.5 and zero otherwise (i.e., a risk premium of
almost 30 percent in a decision with very low stakes). Thus, as long as the participants’
preferences are not extreme, the presence of risk aversion does not aﬀect our predictions.
4R e s u l t s
Table 2 presents summary statistics for information sharing, credit volume, and lenders’
earnings for each of our four treatments. For each statistic the table presents the mean
value across the 5 sessions of each treatment and the highest mean value (max) and lowest
mean value (min) of an individual session.
4.1 Information Sharing
Our results show that adverse selection and lender competition systematically aﬀect infor-
mation sharing. We measure information sharing by the frequency with which lenders join
the credit bureau. As expected, information sharing is most prevalent in the HighMobility-
LowCompetition treatment, where 90% of lenders join the credit bureau. Information
sharing is least frequent in the LowMobility-HighCompetition treatment, where only 47%
of lenders join the bureau. The joint impact of borrower mobility and lender compe-
tition on information sharing is thus substantial in our experiment. A non-parametric
test conﬁrms that information sharing is signiﬁcantly more frequent in the HighMobility-
LowCompetition than in the LowMobility-HighCompetition treatment.10
10All 5 sessions of the HighMobility-LowCompetition treatment display more information sharing, than
any of the 5 sessions of the LowMobility-HighCompetition treatment. A one-sided Mann-Whitney Test
based on session averages therefore yields a coeﬃcient of p = .004.
14Table 2: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Treatments with High Mobility
Treatment HighMob-LowComp HighMob-HighComp
(a=.75, T=160) (a=.75, T=60)
mean max min mean max min
Information sharing 0.90 0.96 0.82 0.86 0.91 0.78
Loans 0.95 0.98 0.91 0.98 1.03 0.93
Good loans 0.92 0.96 0.85 0.90 0.93 0.88
Bad loans 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.14 0.03
Repayments “competition” 237 250 218 175 179 171
Repayments “monopoly” 288 298 275 282 290 270
Proﬁts 289 304 268 266 277 256
Panel B: Treatments with Low Mobility
Treatment LowMob-LowComp LowMob-HighComp
(a=.25, T=160) (a=.25, T=60)
mean max min mean max min
Information sharing 0.56 0.60 0.50 0.47 0.52 0.43
Loans 0.91 0.98 0.89 0.93 0.97 0.88
Good loans 0.87 0.93 0.85 0.87 0.93 0.81
Bad loans 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.03
Repayments “competition” 233 245 215 180 188 173
Repayments “monopoly” 296 298 290 294 297 289
Proﬁts 330 333 328 340 350 331
Notes: The table presents summary statistics by treatment. For each statistic the table presents the
mean value across the 5 sessions of each treatment and the highest mean value (max) and lowest
mean value (min) of an individual session. Information sharing is the frequency with which lenders
join the credit bureau. Loans is the number of loans extended per lender and period. Good loans is
the number of loans extended per lender and period to an entrepreneur which the lender knows is
good. Bad loans is the number of loans extended per lender and period to an entrepreneur which
the lender knows is bad. Repayments “competition” is the repayments demanded by lenders in credit
contracts sealed with good entrepreneurs if both lenders in the region know the entrepreneur is good.
Repayments “monopoly” is the repayments demanded by lenders in credit contracts sealed with good
entrepreneurs if only this lender knows the entrepreneur is good. Proﬁts is the period payoﬀ of lenders.
15The outcome of the HighMobility-HighCompetition treatment suggests that the im-
pact of borrower mobility on information sharing is substantially stronger than that of
lender competition. The level of information sharing in this treatment is surprisingly high
(86%), given that due to strong lender competition, partial information sharing is also
a feasible outcome. Comparing the HighMobility-HighCompetition to the LowMobility-
HighCompetition treatment, we see that an increase in borrower mobility from α = .25
to α = .75 (while holding T = 60) raises the frequency of information sharing from 47%
to 86%.11 In contrast, the diﬀerence in information sharing between the HighMobility-
HighCompetition treatment and the HighMobility-LowCompetition treatment is negligi-
ble. Increasing lender competition by reducing transaction costs from T = 160 to T =6 0
decreases the frequency of information sharing only from 90% to 86%, although our predic-
tions suggest that it could also lead to partial information sharing (50%). Non-parametric
tests suggest that this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant.12
The outcome of the LowMobility-LowCompetition treatment conﬁrms that borrower
mobility has a stronger impact on information sharing in our experiment than lender
competition. The level of information sharing in this treatment is only 56%. Compar-
ing the LowMobility-LowCompetition to the LowMobility-HighCompetition treatment,
we see that increasing transaction costs from T =6 0t oT = 160 (while holding bor-
rower mobility at α = .25) increases the frequency of information sharing only from
47% to 56%, although our predictions suggest this change could lead to full information
sharing.13 In contrast, comparing the LowMobility-LowCompetition to the HighMobility-
LowCompetition treatment we see that the increase in borrower mobility from α = .25 to
α = .75 (while holding T = 160) raises the frequency of information sharing substantially
from 56% to 90%.14
An analysis of information sharing at the regional level conﬁrms that full information
sharing is signiﬁcantly more frequent in the “HighMobility-HighCompetition” treatment
11All 5 sessions of the HighMobility-HighCompetition treatment display more information sharing than
any of the 5 sessions of the LowMobility-HighCompetition treatment. A one-sided Mann-Whitney Test
based on session averages therefore conﬁrms in both cases that information sharing is more prevalent
under high borrower mobility (p = .004).
12In the HighMobility-LowCompetition treatment the frequency of information sharing in the 5 sessions
is .82, .89, .90, .93, .96 respectively. In the HighMobility-HighCompetition treatment the frequency of
information sharing in the 5 sessions is .78, .83, .87, .88, .91 respectively. A one-sided Mann Whitney
test based on session observations thus yields a coeﬃcient of p = .111.
13In the LowMobility-LowCompetition treatment the frequency of information sharing in the 5 sessions
is .50, .55, .56, .60, .60 respectively,. In the LowMobility-HighCompetition treatment the frequency of
information sharing in the 5 sessions is .43, .44, .48, .49, .52 respectively. A one-sided Mann Whitney
test based on session observations thus yields a coeﬃcient of p = .008.
14All 5 sessions of the HighMobility-LowCompetition treatment display more information sharing than
any of the 5 sessions of the LowMobility-LowCompetition treatment. A one-sided Mann-Whitney Test
based on session averages therefore conﬁrms in both cases that information sharing is more prevalent
under high borrower mobility (p = .004).
16than in the “LowMobility-LowCompetition” treatment. Figure 3 displays, by treatment,
the frequency with which both lenders, 1 lender, or no lender in a region join the credit
bureau per region.15 The ﬁgure shows that in the “HighMobility-HighCompetition”
treatment full sharing of information (2 lenders per region) is the most frequent out-
come, occurring 72% of the time. This is only slightly lower than in the “HighMobility-
HighCompetition” treatment, where two lenders per region join the credit bureau in 82%
of the cases. In stark contrast, we ﬁnd that partial information sharing (1 lender per
region) is the dominant outcome in the “LowMobility-LowCompetition” treatment. In
this treatment, both lenders of a region join the credit bureau 24% of the time, while only
one lender joins 64% of the time. Full information sharing in this treatment is thus only
slightly more common than in the “LowMobility-HighCompetition” treatment, where two

















Figure 3: Frequency of Credit Bureau Participation
Why is the frequency of full information sharing substantially higher in the
“HighMobility-HighCompetition” than in the “LowMobility-LowCompetition” treat-
ment? Our predictions suggest that the driving force behind this result are lenders’
beliefs about the information sharing behavior of other lenders. In both treatments it is
payoﬀ-maximizing for the two lenders in region A to join the credit bureau, if they expect
15In each treatment n=600. For each treatment we conducted 5 sessions of 20 periods each. In each
period of each session there are 2 regions in each of the 3 markets.
17that the two non-competing lenders in region B also join. If, however, they believe that
only one non-competitor from region B joins the credit bureau, then the best response of
the second lender in region A is not to join the credit bureau. According to our theory,
therefore, full information sharing may emerge in the “HighMobility-HighCompetition”
because in this treatment second-mover lenders coordinate on full sharing of information.
In contrast, it seems that in the “LowMobility-LowCompetition” treatment second-mover
lenders coordinate on partial information sharing. If “coordination” explains diﬀerences in
information sharing between the “HighMobility-HighCompetition” and the “LowMobility-
LowCompetition” treatment we should ﬁnd that, in both treatments, lenders’ beliefs
about information sharing of other lenders aﬀect their decision to join the credit bureau.
We examine whether this is the case by carrying out a regression analysis of decisions to
join the credit bureau. We relate individual decisions to the lender’s belief about how
many other lenders will join the credit bureau. We did not elicit lenders’ beliefs explicitly
in our experiment. However, we argue that a lender will expect more non-competitors to
join if in the past he or she observed a high rate of participation in the credit bureau.
As an indicator of lenders’ beliefs concerning other lenders information sharing behavior
we therefore take the share of non-competing lenders who joined the credit bureau in all
past markets the lender was involved in. This indicator, which we label ”Past information
sharing”, varies substantially across lenders in each treatment and also varies over time
for all lenders. In the “HighMobility-HighCompetition” treatment the average value of
“Past information sharing” is .85 both in period 2 and period 20, while individual lender
values are in the range [0,1] in period 2, and in the range [.74,.96] in period 20. In the
“LowMobility-LowCompetition” treatment the average value of “Past information shar-
ing” is .58 in period 2 and .56 in period 20, while individual lender values are in the range
[0,1] in period 2, and in the range [.37,.72] in period 20.
Table 3 reports our estimation results, with columns (1) and (2) displaying results
for the “HighMobility-HighCompetition” treatment, while columns (3) and (4) display
results for the “LowMobility-LowCompetition” treatment. Columns (1) and (3) report
the results, when we pool the information sharing decisions of ﬁrst-mover and second-
mover lenders. The coeﬃcients displayed are marginal eﬀects of probit estimations, with
standard errors adjusted for clustering at session level. In order to control for time eﬀects,
not related to changes in lenders’ beliefs, we control for the period in which a decision
takes place. The positive coeﬃcient of “Past information sharing” in column (1) suggests
that beliefs about information sharing of other lenders does aﬀect credit bureau participa-
tion in the “HighMobility-HighCompetition” treatment. In this treatment, lenders who
experienced high credit bureau participation of other lenders in the past are more likely
to share information.
18Table 3: Individual Probability of Information Sharing
Treatment: HighMob-HighComp LowMob-LowComp
Lenders: All 2nd movers All 2nd movers
Past information sharing 0.27 0.327 -0.348 -0.204
[1.96]** [1.67]* [2.97]*** [1.07]
First-mover joined -0.104 -0.309
[1.62] [5.63]***
Period 0 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006
[0.05] [0.22] [1.85]* [2.05]**
Observations 1140 570 1140 570
Notes: The table reports regression estimates using individual data on credit bureau participa-
tion in the “HighMobility-HighCompetition” and “LowMobility-LowCompetition” treatments. All
columns report probit estimates for the probability of a lender joining the credit bureau. Columns
(1) and (3) use data of ﬁrst and second-mover lenders for the “HighMobility-HighCompetition” and
“LowMobility-LowCompetition” treatments. Columns (2) and (4) use data of second-mover lenders
only for the “HighMobility-HighCompetition” and “LowMobility-LowCompetition” treatments. The
regressions use include the following explanatory variables: Past information sharing is the share
of non-competing lenders who joined the credit bureau in markets a lender participated in previous
periods. Period is the period in which the decision to join the credit bureau is made. First mover
joined (for columns (2) and (4) only) is a dummy variable which is one if the ﬁrst-mover in the lender’s
region has decided to join the credit bureau. In all regressions the T-statistics reported in parentheses
are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at session level. * indicates signiﬁcance at the 5
percent level; ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level.
Column (3) shows a contrasting result for the “LowMobility-LowCompetition” treat-
ment. In this treatment the coeﬃcient of “Past information sharing” is negative, sug-
gesting that lenders who experienced high credit bureau participation in the past are less
likely to join the credit bureau. This result is puzzling. It may, however, be explained
by the fact that our analysis includes both ﬁrst-mover and second-mover decisions. If a
ﬁrst-mover expects low credit bureau participation from non-competitors, but thinks that
the second-mover in his region (due to high past credit bureau participation) expects both
competitors to join, then it is rational for the ﬁrst-mover to stay out of the bureau. In order
to rule out this eﬀect we repeat our analysis for second-movers only. Columns (2) and (4)
display the corresponding estimated coeﬃcients for the “HighMobility-HighCompetition”
and the “LowMobility-LowCompetition” treatments. When analyzing second-mover be-
havior, we control for the (observed) decision of the ﬁrst-mover in that region, as this
should reduce incentives of second-movers to share information. Column (4) reveals that
there is no signiﬁcant impact of “Past information sharing” on credit bureau participa-
tion of second-movers in the “LowMobility-LowCompetition” treatment. Column (2),
meanwhile, conﬁrms our earlier result, that information sharing in the “HighMobility-
19HighCompetition” treatment is positively related to past credit bureau participation. As
expected, information sharing of second-movers is lower in both treatments if the ﬁrst-
mover of the region joins the credit bureau.
The analysis displayed in Table 3 suggests that lenders do “coordinate” on full infor-
mation sharing in the “HighMobility-HighCompetition” treatment. Initial credit bureau
participation in this treatment is high. Moreover, lenders who experience full informa-
tion sharing in earlier periods believe that this will continue in future and thus join the
credit bureau in following periods. Information sharing behavior in the “LowMobility-
LowCompetition” treatment seems to be completely diﬀerent. Here, credit bureau par-
ticipation is low in early periods. Moreover, in this treatment, second-mover lenders who
experience high levels of information sharing are not more likely to join the credit bu-
reau in following periods. These ﬁndings suggest that expectations in this treatment are
strongly anchored at partial information sharing.
4.2 Credit and Proﬁts
Lenders’ earnings in our experiment are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by information sharing. The
summary statistics in table 2 display the mean repayments received by lenders on loans
to good borrowers. The table shows that a lender’s earnings from extending credit to
a good borrower depend strongly on whether the competing lender in the same region
also knows that the borrower was good. If only one lender in a region knows that a
particular borrower is good, then this lender should earn a monopoly proﬁt. By design,
the maximum repayment lenders can demand from borrowers is 300 (this was the certain
investment earning of good borrowers). In all four treatments, good borrowers must make
repayments close to 300, if only one lender can identify their type. If, in contrast, both
lenders in a region can identify a good borrower, competition drives repayment demands
down. The lowest repayment which the lender in the same sector as the borrower can
demand (and make non-negative proﬁts) is the cost of funds, 100. Due to transaction
costs T of lending across sector borders, the lowest repayment which the lender in the
other sector of the region can demand (and make non-negative proﬁts) is 100+T.I fb o t h
lenders can identify the same good borrower, competition should thus lower repayment
demands to 100+T. In the “High Competition” treatments (T = 60) this implies a level
of 160, while in the “Low Competition” treatments (T = 160) it implies a repayment level
of 260. Table 2 shows indeed that repayments paid by good borrowers are close to these
competitive levels, when both lenders in a region can identify a good borrower.
Repayment levels suggest that when lenders share information in our experiment, they
do create substantial endogenous competition for good borrowers. This should imply that
lenders earn lower proﬁts in treatments with more information sharing. Our summary
20statistics conﬁrm that this is the case. While lenders in high-mobility treatments extend
similar credit to those in low-mobility treatments, they do earn substantially less from
these loans. On average, lenders earn 41 points more per period in the “LowMobility-
LowCompetition” treatment than in the “HighMobility-LowCompetition” treatment.
Further, lenders earn 74 points more per period in the “LowMobility-HighCompetition”
treatment than in the “HighMobility-HighCompetition” treatment. Non-parametric tests
conﬁrm that these diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant in both comparisons.16
Finally, table 2 shows that the volume and quality of lending in our experiment is
hardly aﬀected by borrower mobility or lender competition. On average, each lender
extends roughly 1 loan per period in all treatments. The number of loans varies slightly
across treatments, but non-parametric tests suggest that diﬀerences between treatments
are insigniﬁcant.17 The quality of lending is extremely high in all treatments. The vast
majority of loans are made to good borrowers, while loans to bad borrowers are rare.
Remembering that there are an equal number of lenders and good borrowers in our credit
market, these results suggest that, in all treatments, lenders managed to extend credit to
most good borrowers, while avoiding loans to the more frequent bad borrowers. Lenders
were thus able to overcome information asymmetries which arise from borrower mobility.
This ﬁnding suggests that the higher level of information sharing in the high-mobility
treatments enabled lenders to fully overcome the higher degree of asymmetric information
in these treatments.
5 Conclusions
We examine how adverse selection and competition in the credit market aﬀect voluntary
information sharing between lenders. Our experimental results conﬁrm that lenders are
more likely to engage in information sharing when they face strong information asym-
16All 5 sessions of the “HighMobility-LowCompetition” treatment display lower per period lender
proﬁts than any of the 5 sessions of the “LowMobility-LowCompetition” treatment. Likewise, all 5
sessions of the “HighMobility-HighCompetition” treatment display lower lender proﬁts than any of the
5 sessions of the “LowMobility-HighCompetition” treatment. A one-sided Mann-Whitney Test based on
session averages therefore conﬁrms in both cases that information sharing is more prevalent under high
borrower mobility (p=.004).
17In the “HighMobility-LowCompetition” treatment the average number of loans per period
and lender is .91, .95, .95, .96, .98 respectively. In the “HighMobility-HighCompetition” treat-
ment this is .93, .94, .99, .99, 1.03 respectively. In the “LowMobility-LowCompetition” treat-
ment this is .89, .90, .90, .90, .98 respectively. In the “LowMobility-HighCompetition” treat-
ment this is .88, .90, .93, .96, .97 respectively. Two-sided Mann Whitney tests based
on session observations thus yield coeﬃcients of p=.42 (“HighMobility-LowCompetition” ver-
sus “HighMobility-HighCompetition”), p=.546 (“LowMobility-LowCompetition” versus “LowMobility-
HighCompetition”),p=.15 (“HighMobility-LowCompetition” versus “LowMobility-LowCompetition”),
and p=.15 (“HighMobility-HighCompetition” versus “LowMobility-HighCompetition”).
21metries. Lenders are less likely to share information when credit market competition is
intense. Our results further suggest that the impact of adverse selection on information
sharing is much stronger than that of lender competition.
Our ﬁndings may explain a puzzling development in credit markets over the past
two decades: Voluntary information sharing through private credit bureaus has grown
most rapidly in the consumer credit market, despite the fact that this market is highly
competitive in most countries. Our results suggest that information sharing may be high in
the consumer credit market despite strong competition, because due to borrower mobility
etc. this market segment is subject to substantial information asymmetries. Under these
circumstances, our ﬁndings suggest that potential adverse selection may drive information
sharing behavior, while lender competition may only be of minor importance.
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24Appendix
A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the decision of a second-mover lender, given that the ﬁrst-mover lender in
t h es a m er e g i o nd o e sn o tj o i nt h ec r e d i tb u r e a u :
• If the lender does not join the credit bureau and the entrepreneurs do not switch regions,
he will conclude a credit contract with the good entrepreneur in his home market, thus
earning a payoﬀ of πL =( Yg −I). If the entrepreneurs do switch regions and the lender is
not a member of the credit bureau, he has no information on any entrepreneurs situated
in his region and will thus not lend. As entrepreneurs switch with probability α,t h e
expected payoﬀ from not joining is EπL =( 1− α)(Yg − I).
• I ft h el e n d e rd o e sj o i na n de n t r e p r e n e u r sd on o ts w i t c h ,h es t i l le a r n sπL =( Yg − I)
as his competitor has no information on the entrepreneurs in the lender’s sector. If the
lender joins and entrepreneurs do switch, he earns zero proﬁts if neither of the two lenders
in the other region of the credit market has joined. The problem is that, in this case,
the lender has no information on any entrepreneurs situated in his region and will thus
not lend. If entrepreneurs switch and one of the two lenders in the other region also
joins, then he has information about the entrepreneurs coming from the other bureau
member and can conclude credit contracts with the good types. Joining therefore results,
for the lender, in either a payoﬀ of πL =( Yg − I)o rπL =( Yg − I − T), depending
on the sector to which the known borrowers from the other region move. The expected
payoﬀ of the lender from joining, given that one other lender in the other region joins, is
EπL = 1
2((Yg − I)+( Yg − I − T)). If entrepreneurs switch and both lenders in the other
region of the credit market join, then the lender knows all good entrepreneurs who come
to his region and his payoﬀ from joining is given by πL =( Yg − I)+( Yg − I − T). Thus,
the lender’s expected payoﬀ from joining depends on the behavior of the lenders in the
other region. However, summarizing we can say that the lenders expected payoﬀ can be
characterized by the following expression, (1−α)(Yg −I)+αγ(Yg −I +Yg −I −T), where
γ ∈{ 0;0.5;1} is the fraction of joining lenders in the other region.
If a the ﬁrst-mover lender does not join the credit bureau, then the second-mover lender is
indiﬀerent between joining and not joining, if both lenders in the other region do not join. But,
if either one or both of the lenders in the other region join, then the lender is strictly better oﬀ
by joining.
Now consider the decision of a second-mover lender, given that the ﬁrst-mover lender in the
same region does join the credit bureau:
• If the lender does not join the credit bureau he will, as above, earn a payoﬀ of πL =( Yg−I)
with the probability (1 − α).
25• If the lender does join and entrepreneurs do not switch he will now only earn a payoﬀ
of πL = T, as his competitor also has information on the entrepreneurs in the lender’s
sector. If the lender does join and entrepreneurs switch, then the following outcomes are
possible: The lender earns a payoﬀ of 0 if neither of the two lenders in the other region
has joined and the lender therefore does not have information on any of the borrowers
in his region. If one of the two lenders in the other region joins, then the lender earns
either a payoﬀ of πL = T, if the known entrepreneurs from the other region move to the
lender’s sector, or πL = 0, if the known entrepreneurs from the other region move to the
competitor’s sector. As both outcomes are equally likely the lender’s expected proﬁt in
the event that only one lender in the other region joins is EπL = 1
2T. I fb o t hl e n d e r s
in the other region join, then the lender’s payoﬀ is given by πL = T,a sh ec a nc o n c l u d e
a credit contract with the good entrepreneur who moves to his sector. Summarizing, we
can therefore state the lender’s expected proﬁt from joining as EπL =( 1− α)T + αγT,
where γ ∈{ 0;0.5;1} is the fraction of lenders in the other region who join.
If the ﬁrst-mover lender does join the credit bureau it is therefore a best response for the
second-mover lender to join if and only if (1 − α + αγ)T>(1 − α)(Yg − I).
A.2 Predictions with risk-averse lenders
In this section we analyze the impact of risk aversion on the lenders’ decisions to join the credit
bureau:
Lemma A1. (second-mover behavior with risk aversion) i) If the ﬁrst-mover lender in a region
does not join the credit bureau, the second-mover lender is strictly better oﬀ by joining if at least
one non-competing lender also joins. If no other lender joins, then the second-mover lender is
indiﬀerent between joining and not. ii) If the ﬁrst-mover lender in a region does join the credit
bureau, then the second-mover lender is better oﬀ by joining only if (1 − α)(Yg − I) − 1
2rα(1 −
α)(Yg −I)2 ≤ (1 − α + γα)T − 1
2r(1−γ)α(1−(1−γ)α)T2, where r is the coeﬃcient of absolute
risk aversion and γ ∈{ 0;0.5;1} is the share of non-competing lenders from the other region that
join.
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the decision of a risk-averse second-mover lender, given that the ﬁrst-mover
lender in the same region does not join the credit bureau:
• From the Proof of Lemma 1 above we know that the expected payoﬀ from not joining
is EπL =( 1− α)(Yg − I), while the expected payoﬀ from joining is (1 − α)(Yg − I)+
αγ(Yg−I+Yg−I−T). Since Yg−I−T>0 any monotonically increasing utility function
u(·) implies that the second-mover lender is indiﬀerent if γ = 0 and strictly better oﬀ by
joining if γ ∈{ 0.5;1}.
Now consider the decision of a risk-averse second-mover lender, given that the ﬁrst-mover
lender in the same region does join the credit bureau. In order to compare utilities from join-
ing and not joining we apply the result of decision theory that a risk averse decision maker’s
certainty equivalent (CE) for a random income with expected value ¯ X and Variance V (X)c a n
be approximated as CE = ¯ X − 1
2r( ¯ X)V (X), where r is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion.
For simplicity we assume that r is constant and identical for all lenders.
26• If the second-mover lender does not join the credit bureau he earns a payoﬀ of πL =( Yg−I)
with the probability (1 − α). Accordingly, his certainty equivalent for this choice is given
by: CE =( 1− α)(Yg − I) − 1
2rα(1 − α)(Yg − I)2.
• If the second-mover lender joins the credit bureau, his expected payoﬀ depends on the
fraction of lenders in the other region who join γ: EπL =( 1− α)T + αγT. We can write
the certainty equivalent as a function of γ in the following way: (1 − α + γα)T − 1
2r(1 −
γ)α(1 − (1 − γ)α)T2.
If the ﬁrst-mover lender does join the credit bureau it is therefore a best response for the second-
mover lender to join if and only if (1 − α)(Yg − I) − 1
2rα(1 − α)(Yg − I)2 ≤ (1 − α + γα)T −
1
2r(1 − γ)α(1 − (1 − γ)α)T2.
Lemma A2. (ﬁrst-mover behavior with risk aversion) i) The ﬁrst-mover lender in a region is
strictly better oﬀ by joining the credit bureau if at least one non-competing lender also joins. ii)
If no non-competing lender joins, the ﬁrst-mover lender is indiﬀerent between joining and not.
Proof. The sequence of arguments is identical to that for the Proof of Lemma 2.
Proposition A1. If lenders are risk-averse, there exists a Nash equilibrium in which all lenders
join the credit bureau with certainty if and only if (1 − α)(Yg − I) − 1
2rα(1 − α)(Yg − I)2 ≤ T.
Proof. The sequence of arguments is identical to that for the Proof of Proposition 1.
Proposition A2. If lenders are risk-averse, there exists a Nash equilibrium in which only the
ﬁrst-mover lender per region joins the credit bureau if and only if (1 − α)(Yg − I) − 1
2rα(1 −









Proof. The sequence of arguments is identical to that for the Proof of Proposition 2.
Observation A1. i) The set of parameter constellations for which full information sharing
is feasible in equilibrium becomes larger when lenders are more risk-averse. Speciﬁcally,
for a given degree of borrower mobility α ∈ (0,1) full information sharing is feasible under
stronger competition if lenders are more risk-averse. ii) The set of parameter constellations
for which partial information sharing is feasible in equilibrium becomes smaller when lenders
are more risk-averse. Speciﬁcally, for a given degree of borrower mobility α ∈ (0,1) the feasi-
bility of partial information sharing requires stronger competition if lenders are more risk-averse.
(For a graphical representation of Observation A1 see Figure A1.)
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the condition for the feasibility of full information sharing in Proposition
A1:
• Proposition A1 deﬁnes the minimal costs of inter-sectoral lending T for each degree of
borrower mobility α, such that full information sharing can be sustained in equilibrium:
T ≥ (1 − α)(Yg − I) − 1
2rα(1 − α)(Yg − I)2. The fact that T is decreasing in r whenever
α ∈ (0,1) implies that full information sharing is feasible under stronger competition if
lenders are more risk-averse.
Consider now the condition for the feasibility of partial information sharing in Proposition A2:
27• In a ﬁrst step we show that there are parameter constellations, which satisfy the feasibility
condition for partial information sharing under risk neutrality but not under risk aversion.
To this end, deﬁne Tu as the upper bound of T for the feasibility of partial information
sharing under risk neutrality (r =0 )f o rag i v e nα: Tu =
(1−α)(Yg−I)
1− 1
2α . It is straightforward
to see that Tu only satisﬁes the condition for the feasibility of partial information sharing
under risk aversion (r>0) if α is either equal to 0 or equal to 1. If α ∈ (0,1), a positive
r has a negative impact on both sides of the feasibility condition, but the absolute size of
the eﬀect is larger for the left-hand side of the condition. To show this we insert Tu on











As a consequence Tu violates the condition whenever r>0a n dα ∈ (0,1).
• I nas e c o n ds t e pw ea r g u et h a tf o ra n yα ∈ (0,1) Tu violates the feasibility condition
for partial information sharing more strongly when lenders are more risk averse (i.e., the
diﬀerence between the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the condition is increasing
in r). This is due to the fact that both sides of the condition decrease linearly in r,b u t
the negative impact is stronger on the left-hand side of the condition for any positive r
(see step 1 above).
• In a third step we proof that in order to satisfy the feasibility condition for partial infor-
mation sharing, T must be lower than Tu if α ∈ (0,1) and lenders are risk averse (r>0).
For this to be the case we need to show that the derivative of the right-hand side of the
condition with respect to r is negative. It is straightforward to verify that this is satisﬁed
for all r< 2
αT . However, in order for the approximation of the certainty equivalents to be
reasonable this condition must be satisﬁed anyway (the certainty equivalent on the left-
hand side of the feasibility condition is only positive as long as r< 2
α(Yg−I) < 2
αT ). Thus,
the upper bound of T for the feasibility of partial information sharing under risk aversion
for a given α ∈ (0,1) must be strictly lower than Tu. Furthermore, step 2 implies that the
upper bound is decreasing in r, which means that for a given α ∈ (0,1) the feasibility of
partial information sharing requires stronger competition if lenders are more risk-averse.
Observation A2. Although the presence of risk averse lenders aﬀects the set of parame-
ter constellations for which multiple equilibria can be sustained, the predictions for our four
treatments are only aﬀected if lenders are highly risk averse. In order for the “HighMobility-
HighCompetition” treatment (“LowMobility-LowCompetition” treatment) to drop from the set of
constellations with multiple equilibria the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion needs to be at least
r =0 .47 (r =0 .53).
Proof. Solving the condition for the feasibility of partial information sharing (Proposition A2)






2α)T2]. Entering the parameter values of the experiment
(converted to US-$, i.e. 150 Points = 1 Swiss Franc = 0.83 US-$) yields the reported numbers.
28Figure A1: Market Equilibria under Risk Neutrality and Risk Aversion
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Appendix B: Instructions 
The following instructions are a translation of the original German instructions for our 
"HighMobility-HighCompetition" treatment. In this treatment the mobility of entrepreneurs 
("probability of changing location" in the instructions) is .75, and the costs of cross-sectoral 
lending ("transactions costs" in the instructions) are T=160. The instructions for the other three 
treatments are identical, except that all references to "probability of changing location" and 
"transaction costs" bear the corresponding parameters of those treatments. The original 
instructions for all four treatments, as well as the z-Tree codes are available from the authors. 
Instructions
You are about to participate in an economic experiment. Please read the following instructions 
carefully. These will provide you with all the necessary information for your participation in this 
experiment. If there is anything you do not understand, please raise your hand. We will then 
answer your question at your seat. 
You will receive a show-up fee of 10 Swiss francs. You can earn a further sum of money during 
the experiment by gaining points. 
The experiment is divided into 20 periods. You can earn points in each of these periods. The 
number of points you earn depends on your decisions and those of the other participants. All the 
points you earn during the 20 periods are converted to francs at the end of the experiment. The 
following exchange rate applies: 
150 points = 1 franc 
At the end of the experiment you will immediately receive the sum of money that you earned 
plus your show-up fee in cash. 
Please note that communication with the other participants is strictly prohibited during the entire 
experiment. We further advise you that you may only use those functions on the computer which 
are necessary for running the experiment. Communicating with other participants or playing 
around with the computer will lead to exclusion from the experiment. We are available to answer 
any questions you might have. 
Twelve persons are participating in this experiment. You and all other participants are creditors 
for the entire duration of the experiment. Experiment 1  Instructions  Page 2
Short summary of the experiment procedures 
A total of 12 persons are participating in this experiment. There are three credit markets in each 
period with four persons each. In each period you will be assigned to a credit market with three 
other randomly chosen participants. A credit market consists of two regions, Region A and 
Region B. Each region is divided into two sectors; Region A consists of Sectors 1 and 2, and 
Region B consists of Sectors 3 and 4. There are one creditor (K) and four entrepreneurs (U) in 
each of the four sectors.
1 You and the other three participants are the creditors. You will be 
randomly assigned to the role of a creditor (K1, K2, K3 or K4) in each period. The computer 
simulates the entrepreneurs. 
Each creditor can extend credit to the entrepreneurs in his or her region, meaning that creditors 
K1 and K2 can grant credits to the entrepreneurs in the sectors 1 and 2, while creditors K3 and 
K4 can grant credits to the entrepreneurs in the sectors 3 and 4. The costs for granting credits 
depend on the sector in which the entrepreneur is. If the entrepreneur is in your own sector, the 
extension of credit involves no cost. If, however, the entrepreneur is in the other sector of your 
region, you must pay additional costs. 
The entrepreneurs have no equity of their own and require a credit of 100 points each for the 
realization of a project. There are two types of entrepreneurs: "good" entrepreneurs and "bad" 
entrepreneurs. The good entrepreneurs' projects are always successful and yield an income of 300 
points. The bad entrepreneurs' projects are never successful, yielding an income of 0 points. The 
entrepreneurs can only repay a credit if they yield an income, meaning that only the good 
entrepreneurs are able to repay credits. 
1 "K" stands for "Kreditgeber", the German of creditor, while "U" stands for "Unternehmer" the German for entrepreneur. Experiment 1  Instructions  Page 3
The procedure in a credit market is the same in each period and is organized as follows: 
1) Information about the entrepreneurs in your sector 
There are one good and three bad entrepreneurs in each sector of the credit market. Which of the 
entrepreneurs is the good one will be randomly determined anew in each period. At the beginning 
of the period you only know which entrepreneur is good in your sector. You have no information 
about the entrepreneurs in the other three sectors of the credit market. 
2) Joining the information center 
In each period, you have the possibility of acquiring information about the entrepreneurs in the 
other sectors of the credit market. To do this, you must decide whether to join the information 
center for this period. If you join, you will be a member of the information center, for this period. 
As a member, you will learn from all the other members of the information center which 
entrepreneurs are good in their sectors. The other members of the information center will 
obviously also be informed which entrepreneur in your sector is good. If you choose not to join 
the information center, you will receive no information about the entrepreneurs in the other 
sectors, but no one will be informed about the entrepreneurs who are in your sector. 
3) Change of location by entrepreneurs: 
There is a chance in every period that the entrepreneurs will change their location. Random 
chance will decide whether the entrepreneurs remain in the same sector or if they move to 
another region. In the event of a change, the entrepreneurs move as a group from their original 
sector to a sector of another region (Example: U1-U4 move from Sector 1 to Sector 3). 
4) Credit offers 
After the location of the entrepreneurs has been determined, the credit phase begins. You as 
creditor can now make credit offers to a maximum of two entrepreneurs who are situated in your 
region. The amount of information you have about the entrepreneurs in your region depends on 
two factors: 1) whether the entrepreneurs moved and 2) whether you are a member of the 
information center. 
Each creditor receives an endowment of 200 points in each period, with which he or she can 
make credit offers. A credit offer consists of a loan of 100 points and a repayment demand. The 
entrepreneurs are simulated by the computer and are programmed to automatically accept the 
credit offer with the lowest repayment. If your credit offer is accepted, you will only receive the 
repayment you demanded if the entrepreneur is good. Bad entrepreneurs never pay back. 
5) Income calculation: 
After the credit offers have been accepted, incomes are determined for this period. At the end of 
the experiment your income from all 20 periods will be added together, converted to Swiss 
francs, and paid out to you in cash, together with your show-up fee. Experiment 1  Instructions  Page 4
Detailed experiment procedures 
During the experiment you enter your decisions by computer. In the following, we show in detail 
how you can make your decisions in each period. 
A total of twelve subjects participate in this experiment. All participants are creditors for the 
duration of the experiment. In each period there are three credit markets with four creditors each. 
The composition of the credit markets will be re-determined randomly at the beginning of each 
period. This means that you are with other creditors in the market in each period. 
1. Information about entrepreneurs in your sector
(1.1) All credit markets have the same structure at the beginning of a period: 
 There are four sectors (S1, S2, S3, S4) in each credit market, where two sectors each belong 
to the same region. Sectors 1 and 2 belong to region A and Sectors 3 and 4 belong to region 
B.
 There is a creditor in each sector (K1 in Sector 1, K2 in Sector 2, K3 in Sector 3, and K4 in 
Sector 4). 
 There are 4 entrepreneurs in each sector (U1-U4 in Sector 1, U5-U8 in Sector 2, U9-U12 in 
Sector 3, und U13-U16 in Sector 4). 
(1.2) In each period, the four participants of a credit market are assigned randomly to the four 
sectors. As a creditor, you will see which sector you are in at the beginning of each period on 
your screen (see the screen on the next page). 
 At the top of the screen, you will see which period you are in. 
 Below this, you will see which position you assume as creditor (K1, K2, K3 or K4). 
 The area on the left of the screen provides a summary of the credit market. Sectors 1 and 2 
are in region A and have a yellow background; sectors 3 and 4 in region B have a blue one. 
 One creditor is represented in each sector. Your position as creditor is displayed in color. 
(1.3) This screen also shows information about the entrepreneurs in your sector. There are two 
types of entrepreneurs, "good" entrepreneurs and "bad" entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs have no 
equity of their own and each needs a credit of 100 points for the realization of a project. 
 There is one good entrepreneur and three bad entrepreneurs in each sector. 
 The projects of good entrepreneurs are always successful and yield an income of 300 points. 
 The projects of bad entrepreneurs are never successful and yield an income of 0 points. 
 Entrepreneurs can only repay a credit if they earn an income, implying that good 
entrepreneurs always pay back and bad entrepreneurs never pay back. 
 On your screen you will see which entrepreneurs in your sector are "good" and which three 
entrepreneurs are "bad". The good entrepreneur appears in green, while the bad entrepreneurs 
appear in red. 
 You will not see which entrepreneurs in the other sectors are good or bad; for this reason, 
these entrepreneurs all appear gray. Experiment 1  Instructions  Page 5
  (1.4) The three other creditors in the market also only receive information about the 
entrepreneurs in their own sectors. This means that the other creditors do not know which 
entrepreneur is good in your market. 
2. Joining the information center
(2.1) In each period you must decide whether you wish to join the information center in your 
market. For this purpose, the entry mask "Joining the information center" appears on the right 
side of your screen. You can now decide whether you want to become a member of the 
information center.
 If you press "yes", you will become a member of the information center in this period. In this 
case, the other members of the information center will be informed which entrepreneur in 
your sector is good and which are bad. In return, you will be informed which entrepreneurs in 
the sectors of the other members are good and which are bad.  
 If you press "no", you will not become a member of the information center in this period. In 
this case, no information about the entrepreneurs in your sector will be available in the 
information center. However, you will not receive any information about the entrepreneurs in 
the other sectors. 
 Within a region, the two creditors decide after one another whether they wish to join the 
information center. The order of the decision is determined randomly in each period. If you 
are the second creditor in your region, you will be informed whether the other creditor in 
your region has already joined before making your decision. 
1 of 1
Period 
Joining the information center 
You are creditor K1
Remaining time (sec) 
Would you like to join the information center? 
Creditor K2 will then make his decision. 
Creditor K2 will then be informed about your 
decision whether to enter. 
You, as creditor K1, decide first. 
You are in Region A 
o Yes
o No 
Please confirm your choice with the OK 
buttonExperiment 1  Instructions  Page 6
 You will not be informed whether the other creditors from the other regions joined the 
information center until all creditors have made their decisions. 
 Membership in the information center bears no cost for any creditor. 
(2.2) As soon as all creditors have decided whether they wish to join, you will see which 
creditors have joined the information center on the right side of your screen. If you are a member 
of the information center, you will also be informed which entrepreneurs in the other members' 
sectors are good and which are bad. In this case, good entrepreneurs appear in green and bad 
entrepreneurs are red. If you have no information about entrepreneurs, they remain gray. If you 
are not a member of the information center, you will receive no information about the 
entrepreneurs in the other sectors.  
Example 1: You are creditor K1, and you join the information center. Creditors K2 and K4 also 
join, but creditor K3 does not. In this case, after your decision to join, you will be informed 
which of the following entrepreneurs are good or bad: U1-U4, U5-U8, U13-U16. You still have 
no information about entrepreneurs U9 - U12. Creditors K2 and K4 have the same information as 
you do, while creditor K3 only knows about entrepreneurs U9 - U12. 
Example 2: You are creditor K1, and you do NOT join the information center, while creditors 
K2, K3, and K4 enroll. In this case, you only know about the entrepreneurs in your own sector, 
meaning that you only know which entrepreneur from U1 - U4 is good. You have no information 
about any other entrepreneurs. Creditors K2, K3, and K4 are informed abut all entrepreneurs U5-
U8, U9-U12 and U13-U16. However, they do not know which entrepreneur is good in your 
sector.  Experiment 1  Instructions  Page 7
3. Change of location for entrepreneurs
(3.1) In every period, there is a chance that the entrepreneurs will change their location. 
 There is a probability of ¾ that all entrepreneurs will change their regions. In this case, all 
entrepreneurs in Region A change to Region B, and all entrepreneurs in Region B change to 
Region A. When the entrepreneurs change location, they change in groups: U1-U4 move to 
Sector 3, U5-U8 to Sector 4, U9-U12 to Sector 1, and U13-U16 to Sector 2 (see the screen 
below). It is thus clear that after changing locations there is still one good entrepreneur and 
three bad entrepreneurs in each sector. 
 There is a probability of ¼ that all entrepreneurs remain in their original sectors. 
(3.2) The roll of a dice determines in each period whether the entrepreneurs change location or 
not. The field "change of location" appears at the right on your screen for this purpose. You see a 
list with three numbers in this field (1, 2, 3, 4). To the right of each number "change" or "stay" 
appears, meaning that "stay" is next to one number and "change" is next to three numbers. The 
number which has "stay" next to it is determined separately for each of the three credit markets in 
each period. This allocation applies to all four participants in a credit market. After the number 
list appears on your screen, a participant in the experiment casts a four-sided die in order to 
determine which random number applies for this period. The number rolled will then be 
announced aloud. You will immediately see the effects of this number on your credit market, i.e. 
The number cast is
3
This means: 
The entrepreneurs change location 










You are creditor K1
Remaining time [sec]: 
Period 1 of 1 Experiment 1  Instructions  Page 8
whether all entrepreneurs remain in their original sector or if they change regions. When the 
entrepreneurs change, they will be moved directly into the new sectors on your screen. 
(3.3) The screen shown above presents an example where the entrepreneurs change their regions. 
The number cast is three. The table shows that the number 3 stands for "change" in this credit 
market. 
(3.3) The information you as creditor have about the entrepreneurs will not be influenced by a 
change of location. You know before or after any change of location whether the same 
entrepreneurs are good or bad.
4. Credit Phase
 (4.1) The credit phase begins after it has been determined whether the entrepreneurs change 
location or not. In this phase, you can make credit offers to a maximum of 2 entrepreneurs in 
your region. You have a capital of 200 points for this purpose in each period. 
(4.2) During the credit phase you will see the screen displayed below:  
 The credit phase in each period lasts for a total of 90 seconds. The numbers on the upper right 
side of your screen indicate how long the credit phase will last.  
 The left side of your screen provides a summary of all entrepreneurs in your region. If you 
have information about entrepreneurs, either because the entrepreneurs were originally in 
your sector or because you are a member of the information center, this information is again 
presented using the colors green (for good entrepreneurs) and red (for bad entrepreneurs). 
Entrepreneurs for whom you have no information are presented in gray. 
 You can now make credit offers to the entrepreneurs in your region. You must decide whether 
you wish to make an offer to each entrepreneur in your region. For this purpose each 




2 "A" stands for "Angebot", the German for "offer", "K" stands for "kein Angebot", the German for "no offer".Experiment 1  Instructions  Page 9
(4.3) If you want to make a credit offer to an entrepreneur, click on the field "A" next to this 
entrepreneur. The entry mask for the credit offer will now appear on the right. 
 The credit amount is always 100 points. 
 You must determine the amount of the demanded repayment. Please take note that the 
minimum repayment is 100 points and the maximum is 300 points. 
100  demanded repayment  300 
(4.4) The credit offer is complete after you have determined the demanded repayment. You can 
now click the "OK" button to conclude the offer. You can not change any concluded offer after 
pressing the "OK" button. If you have not yet pressed this button, you can change your offer or 
cancel it with the "cancel" button. 
(4.5) Every credit offer you make appears in a list at the bottom of your screen. You will see to 
which entrepreneurs you have made an offer and how high your demanded repayment is. During 
the credit phase, no other creditor will be informed about the offers you have made. You 
will also not be informed which credit offers other creditors have made.
(4.6) You can make a maximum of two credit offers in each period. However, you are not 
required to make credit offers. If you do not want to make a credit offer to an entrepreneur in 
your region, then choose "K" for this entrepreneur. You must either make an offer or click "K" 
for every entrepreneur in your region. You can only then conclude your offers with "continue". 
You are creditor K1
Period 1 of 1 
Remaining time [sec] 
For your information 







You are in region A. 
Entrepreneur Dem.  Repay. Trans. costs
Offer to entrepreneur 9 
Credit Amount  100 
Demanded repayment 
Transaction costs  0 
Here you see your offers
Cancel OK
ContinueExperiment 1  Instructions  Page 10
(4.7) As soon as all creditors have made their credit offers, the entrepreneurs choose one. We 
have programmed the entrepreneurs so that they always accept the lowest repayment:
 If an entrepreneur only receives a credit offer from one creditor in his region, he will accept 
this in any case. 
 If he receives an offer from both creditors in his region, he will choose the offer with the 
lowest demanded repayment. If both demanded repayments are equally high, he will chose 
the credit offer from the entrepreneur located in his sector. 
(4.8) If one of your credit offers is accepted, you must bear the transaction costs for 
concluding the credit. The following rule applies in this case: 
 Transaction costs for an entrepreneur located in your sector amount to 0 points.  
 Transaction costs for an entrepreneur who is not located in your sector are 160 points.  
If a credit offer is not accepted, you do not have to pay any transaction costs. 
0  if the entrepreneur is in your sector. 
Transaction costs = 
160 if the entrepreneur is not in your sector.
 (4.9) As soon as the credit offers are accepted, you will see which offers were made by you and 
by the other creditors in your region on your screen (see screen below). 
 The right side of your screen shows which credit offers were made for each entrepreneur in 
your region, either by you or by the other creditors, and which offers each entrepreneur 
accepted. 
 The left side of the screen gives a presentation of your region, showing whether the 
entrepreneurs in your region are good (green) or bad (red). 
(4.10) Your income is calculated at the bottom of your screen. If one of your credit offers was 
accepted, this area will show you the repayment you received from this credit and your credit 
income from this contract. However, you will only receive your demanded repayment if the 
entrepreneur is good. If the entrepreneur who accepted the credit is bad, he earns no income. Bad 
entrepreneurs can thus make no repayment.  
demanded repayment  if the entrepreneur is good 
Actual repayment = 
0 if the entrepreneur is bad
The next section shows how your total income in each period is calculated in detail. Experiment 1  Instructions  Page 11
5. Calculation of income
(5.1) As soon as all credit offers have been accepted, the income for all creditors in this period 
will be determined. Creditors' incomes are all determined in the same way. 
(5.2) Your income as a creditor consists of your certain income and your credit income. Your 
certain income corresponds to that part of your capital which you did not use for extending 
credit. If you did not conclude any credits, you earn a certain income of 200 points. 
Your certain income = 200 – credits 
(5.3) If you concluded credits, your credit income corresponds to your actual repayments minus 
the transaction costs. 
Your credit income = actual repayments – transaction costs 
(5.4) Your total income in a period is the sum of your certain income and credit income. Your 
total income thus depends on which credits you have concluded and whether the entrepreneur 
could make the repayment. 
Your income = 200 – credits + actual repayments – transaction costs 
To U DemR K1 DemR K2  Accept 
You are creditor K1
Remaining time [sec]:  1 of 1
Period 
Your assured income = 0
Your credit income =  XX
Your income =  XX 
Here you see the calculation of your income.
You concluded two contracts in this period: 
Here you see all offers to entrepreneurs in your region.  You are in region A. 
To Entrepreneur  Transact. Costs Type of Entre. Actual repay Credit income 
U11 0  Good  XX XX 
U15 160  Good XX  XX 
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Example 1: You only made one credit offer in a period. Your offer goes to an entrepreneur 
located in your sector whom you know to be good. Your demanded repayment is 200 points. The 
other creditor makes no offer to this entrepreneur. The entrepreneur therefore accepts your offer. 
Your certain income is 200 – 100 = 100 points, as you only concluded one credit. As the 
entrepreneur is good, he will make your demanded repayment. You do not have to pay any 
transaction costs, as the entrepreneur is in your sector. Your credit income thus amounts to 200 
points. Your total income equals 300 points. 
Example 2: You only made one credit offer in a period. Your offer goes to an entrepreneur 
located in your sector whom you know to be good. Your demanded repayment amounts to 200 
points. The other creditor also makes an offer to this entrepreneur and demands a repayment of 
150. The entrepreneur accepts the other creditor's offer. Your certain income is 200 points, as you 
did not conclude a credit. Your credit income is 0 points. Your total income is thus 200 points. 
Example 3: You only made one credit offer to an entrepreneur in the other sector of your region, 
and you do not know if this entrepreneur is good or bad. Your demanded repayment is 200 
points. The other creditor in your region also makes an offer to this entrepreneur and demands a 
repayment of 250. The entrepreneur accepts your offer. Your certain income is 200 – 100 = 100 
points, as you concluded one credit. You pay transaction costs of 160 points, as the entrepreneur 
is in the other sector. If the entrepreneur is good, your credit income will thus amount to 200 – 
160 = 40 points (and your total income is therefore 140 points). If the entrepreneur is bad, your 
credit income will amount to 0 – 160 = –160 points (and your total income is therefore –60 
points). 
(5.6) Please note that as a creditor you can earn negative incomes in every period. This can 
happen if you make offers to bad creditors. You can always avoid negative incomes with your 
own decisions. If you earn negative incomes, you must pay these with points earned in earlier 
periods or, if necessary, with your show-up fee. 
(5.7) The experiment lasts for 20 periods, and the procedure is the same in all periods. In each 
period, you will be assigned randomly to a credit market with three other participants. It will also 
be randomly determined in each period which entrepreneur in each sector of the credit market is 
good and which entrepreneurs are bad.  
(5.8) The experiment will not begin until all participants are completely familiar with the 
experimental procedures. In order to make sure of this, we ask you to answer some control 
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Exercises
Please answer these questions fully, showing the detailed steps of your solution. If you have 
questions, please contact the experimenter. Wrong answers have no consequences for you. 
Question 1 
You are creditor K1. The other creditor in your region (K2) has decided to join the information 
center. Both creditors in the other region join the information center. The entrepreneurs REMAIN 
in their original locations. 
a) You decide not to join the information center. 
Which entrepreneurs in your region do you know to be good (or bad)? 
U1 U2 U3 U4    U5 U6 U7 U8 
           
Which entrepreneurs in your region does creditor K2 know to be good (or bad)? 
U1 U2 U3 U4    U5 U6 U7 U8 
           
b) How does the information constellation change if you join the information center? 
Which entrepreneurs in your region do you know to be good (or bad)? 
U1 U2 U3 U4    U5 U6 U7 U8 
           
Which entrepreneurs in your region does creditor K2 know to be good (or bad)? 
U1 U2 U3 U4    U5 U6 U7 U8 
           
Question 2 
You are creditor K1. The other creditor in your region (K2) has decided to join the information 
center. Both creditors in the other region join the information center. The entrepreneurs 
CHANGE their original locations. 
a) You decide not to join the information center.  
Which entrepreneurs in your region do you know to be good (or bad)? 
U9  U10 U11 U12    U13 U14 U15 U16 
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Which entrepreneurs in your region does creditor K2 know to be good (or bad)? 
U9  U10 U11 U12    U13 U14 U15 U16 
           
b) How does the information constellation change if you join the information center? 
Which entrepreneurs in your region do you know to be good (or bad)? 
U1 U2 U3 U4    U5 U6 U7 U8 
           
Which entrepreneurs in your region does creditor K2 know to be good (or bad)? 
U1 U2 U3 U4    U5 U6 U7 U8 
           
Question 3 
You are creditor K1. The other creditor in your region (K2) has decided NOT to join the 
information center. Both creditors in the other region join the information center. The 
entrepreneurs REMAIN in their original locations. 
a) You decide not to join the information center.  
Which entrepreneurs in your region do you know to be good (or bad)? 
U9  U10 U11 U12    U13 U14 U15 U16 
           
Which entrepreneurs in your region does creditor K2 know to be good (or bad)? 
U9  U10 U11 U12    U13 U14 U15 U16 
           
b) How does the information constellation change if you join the information center? 
Which entrepreneurs in your region do you know to be good (or bad)? 
U1 U2 U3 U4    U5 U6 U7 U8 
           
Which entrepreneurs in your region does creditor K2 know to be good (or bad)? 
U1 U2 U3 U4    U5 U6 U7 U8 
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Question 4 
You are creditor K1. The other creditor in your region (K2) has decided NOT to join the 
information center. Both creditors in the other region join the information center. The 
entrepreneurs CHANGE their original locations. 
a) You decide not to join the information center.  
Which entrepreneurs in your region do you know to be good (or bad)? 
U9  U10 U11 U12    U13 U14 U15 U16 
           
Which entrepreneurs in your region does creditor K2 know to be good (or bad)? 
U9  U10 U11 U12    U13 U14 U15 U16 
           
b) How does the information constellation change if you join the information center? 
Which entrepreneurs in your region do you know to be good (or bad)? 
U1 U2 U3 U4    U5 U6 U7 U8 
           
Which entrepreneurs in your region does creditor K2 know to be good (or bad)? 
U1 U2 U3 U4    U5 U6 U7 U8 
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Question 5 
You made no credit offer. How high is your income in the period in question?   
Your certain income =  
Your credit income =  
Your total income = 
Question 6 
You concluded a credit with an entrepreneur located in your sector; you do not know if he is a 
good or a bad entrepreneur. Your demanded repayment is 200 points. 
a) How high is your income in the period in question if the entrepreneur is good? 
Your certain income =  
Your credit income =  
Your total income = 
b) How high is your income in the period in question if the entrepreneur is bad? 
Your certain income =  
Your credit income =  
Your total income = 
Question 7 
You concluded a credit with an entrepreneur located outside of your sector; you do not know if 
he is a good or a bad entrepreneur. Your demanded repayment is 200 points. 
a) How high is your income in the period in question if the entrepreneur is good? 
Your certain income =  
Your credit income =  
Your total income = 
b) How high is your income in the period in question if the entrepreneur is bad? 
Your certain income =  
Your credit income =  
Your total income = Experiment 1  Instructions  Page 17
Question 8 
You have made a credit offer. The offer is for the good entrepreneur in your sector. Your 
demanded repayment is 300 points. 
a) The other creditor in your region makes no credit offer to this entrepreneur. How high is your 
income in this period? 
Your certain income =  
Your credit income =  
Your total income = 
b) The other creditor in your region offers this entrepreneur a credit with a demanded repayment 
of 150 points. How high is your income in this period? 
Your certain income =  
Your credit income =  
Your total income = 
Question 9 
You have made a credit offer. The offer is for the good entrepreneur in the other sector of your 
region. Your requested repayment is 300 points. 
a) The other creditor in your region makes no credit offer to this entrepreneur. How high is your 
income in the period in question? 
Your certain income =  
Your credit income =  
Your total income = 
b) The other creditor in your region offers this entrepreneur a credit with a demanded repayment 
of 150 points. How high is your income in the period in question? 
Your certain income =  
Your credit income =  
Your total income = 
When you have finished solving these exercises, we advise you to red through the questions and 
your solutions again. We then suggest that you consider which decisions you wish to make in the 
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